T he essen tial featu re of Ca pgras' synd rome is the delusio n o n the part o f th e o ne afflict ed that persons who are very important and fam iliar to him ha ve be en replaced by doubles (2) . Indeed, th e syndrome so met imes tak es the form wh ere th e doubles are seen as in vader s fr om outer space (3) . This syn drome has al ways been fou nd in t he co n tex t o f another psychosis, usuall y schizophrenia . It is d escribed as int ell ectual r ec ognition in th e a bsence of emotional famil iarity (some wha t th e in verse of deja vu). It ha s been exp lained both ne urophysio logica lly (4) a nd psych odynamically (5) . My purpose in this essay is no t to seek a better ex plana tio n for this syndrome. It is rath er to exa mine the impact of this threat of th e di ssociation o f intell ect a nd feeling, of body and soul, upon soc ie ty and medi cin e as a whole.
For th ose whose bodies have been snatc hed , body and sou l have been di sconnect ed. Their body no longer manifest s th eir so ul's reality. Externally, no th in g is different, wh ile in te rna lly, nothing is t he same. The appearan ce of th ese people now belies rather than reveal s th eir reali ty.
This d issociation o f body fr om so ul and ap pearance fro m reality repeats as d ram a th e ver y situ ation in to whi ch Rene Descartes placed himsel f at the begin n in g of h is fa mous Meditations. Desca rtes' purpose in these Meditations was to di sco ver a sec ure fo u ndat io n up on which a " fir m a nd permanen t structure " o f scie n t ific knowledge co uld be ba sed. As a fir st ste p toward t h is goal, Descartes so ug h t to fr ee himsel f of th e scholast icism th at d omi nated the int e llectu a l cl im ate of hi s d ay. He wanted to make po ssibl e a bod y of na tural sciences un encumbered b y Aristotelean metaph ysics. To t h is e nd, he sought to " . . . ser io usly and freel y address m ysel f to th e uph eaval of all my former opinions." H e thus em p loye d a ' method of d oubt' accordi ng to wh ich he agreed to " . .. withhold my asse n t from matters whic h are not entirely certain and indubitable ."
In pursu ing thi s method , Desca rtes did not scrutinize each of h is beli efs sing ly, "whic h wo uld be a n e nd less u ndertak ing," b u t sought to di sco ver and d iscard a ll the dubitabl e beli e fs th at underlie our kn owledge . By su bj ecting those basic beli efs t hat we ta ke most fo r g ra n te d to the most severe doubt possible , Descartes so ugh t to find absolutely indubitable bel ie fs to se rve as t he foundati on fo r hi s edifice of kn owl edge . Ho weve r , to moun t an d sustain such a doubt was no easy tas k. To p roceed fro m th e possib ilit y that a ny of our beliefs might be false to th e possibil it y tha t all o ur beli efs m ight be false is an im plau sibl e inferen ce for wh ich even Descartes had diffi culty providing a reasonable basis: "How are we to d eny th e obvious wit hou t bein g mad?"
To mak e h is hy pe r bo lic d oubt pla usibl e , Desca rtes postul ated an evil d em o n wit h th e ca paci ty to se parate ap peara nce from real it y: " I shall then suppose , not th at God, who is su p re mely good and th e foundati on of tr uth, b ut some evil ge nius not less power ful than d eceitful , has employed hi s whole energies in dece iving me . . ." ( I) . T he ev il d em on is th e veh icle by whic h he makes co nc rete what I will ca ll " t he Cartesia n threat": t hat what we see may te ll us nothin g of what truly exists, that the be havio r of others may reveal no thi ng of their true beliefs.
Insofar as th is threat of universal error applies to o u r kn o wledge of other people, it is the same threat as that posed b y the body-snatch e rs. Fo r Descar tes under the method of doubt, as we ll as for those inhabitants o f a wo rld in which body-snatchers are known to be loose, proofmust preced e tru st. Eac h pe rso n is not himse lf until he is proven to be. This is a remarkable inversion in both common se nse and common decency. It is the genius of these movies t hat t hey effectively dramatize this interpersonal state. By loo king at the Invasion ofthe Body-Snatchers movies as d ramatizations of the Cartesian threat of uni versal d ece it, p ret e nse and dissimulation, we will be able to see that this th reat is not merely an epistemologist's pedantry, but an inchoate evil that haunts o ur dail y lives.
O ppo site this danger lies the safe haven to which we run. In th ese movies t he Cartesian threat ca lls forth a medica l response. For all th e miracles of modern medicine, it remains curious that t he dissociation of soul from body is considered a problem for p hys icians. Pr ecisel y why is th e Cartesian th rea t of u n ive rsal dissimulation considered a medical problem? Examining this quest io n will allow us to better understand how the role of medicine in society ex tends beyond its battle with bacteria, cancer, and heart di sease . We will see how medicine functions as both defender against th e Cartesian threat a nd as itsel f a perpetrator of this threat. Throughout, I will focu s specifica lly o n t he Cartesian dissociation of proof from trust. I will not di scuss Desca rtes' own id eas a bo ut medicine which have been discussed recently elsewhere (7) .
BODY SNATCHING AS THE WORK OF DESCART ES' D EMON
The specia l tal ent of Descartes' demon is to syste ma tica lly d isco n nect appearance from reality. In our everyday lives we ma y misinte rpret an y gi ven appearance. We all live with the natural threat of occasional er ror : th at ma y not be Aunt Betty in the distance but some other wo ma n . T he general and syste mat ic di ssociation of appearance from reality perpetrated by Descar tes' demon is a problem not mere ly of greater degree , but of a n e nt ir ely different kind. After such a d issociaton, evidence leads awa y from rath er th an toward truth . There remains no reliable means to distinguish mere a ppea ra nce from reality .
In the original movie, the psychiatrist, Dan Kaufman , evo ke s just this sta te as he admonishes Dr. Bennell after Ben ne ll reports he ha s fo u nd a co py of hi s friend Jack growing on his bill iard table: "Men, women , and child ren had j ust discovered that their relatives weren't their re lat ives at all. So yo u r m ind started playing tricks and rea lity became unreality. The dead man became Jack 's d o ubl e in yo u r eyes. " He goes on to explain that he is co n vince d Bennell is repo rting appearance accurately but that it has nothing to do with reality. " It happen ed in eve ry d etail , but only in yo u r mind." By separating appearance fr om r eal ity the demon isolates us in our mind apart from the real world and fr om o ther people.
Each human has the capacity to dissociate his personal appearance fro m h is personal reality. That is, each of us can dissemble or dissimulate by hidin g u nde r a false appearance . This is most obvious in cases of prolonged or e la bo rate d eceit such as that of a traitor or spy. For these people, loyalty, patriotism, and in d eed the vast majority of their lives, can become mere appearance.
Two things are unique about this dissociation as it is found in Desca rtes an d in these movies. First, the Demon and the Body-snatchers impose the d issimulated state. Their victims do not choose to deceive. This produces th e second unique aspect. Dissimulation ceases to be a specific act and becomes an end uring state; it becomes the rule rather than the exception in human interaction. In a way independent of the victim's will, his human body is transform ed in to a huma n guise. The victim's body is now a mask that conceals rather than rev eals hi s true nature. Thus sudden and total transformation is new to Dr. Bennell : " In m y practice I've seen people's humanity drain away, but slowly, not all at o nce." Once snatched, people are no longer able to express feelings or perhaps even to have them.
This erosion of trust served Descartes' purposes well. H e hoped to replace trust with proof in all matters of knowledge. He sought to take nothing for granted and thereby build a secure foundation for knowledge once and fo r a ll. Trust, like faith is always vulnerable to doubt and will be systema ticall y suppressed in a method of doubt.
In the original movie, this erosion of trust produces the rapid e rosio n of th e community. Objectively, the community is being taken over by aliens in famil ia r human bodies. This is enough by itself to destroy the most stable of co mm unities. Yet, running before this like a wave through the town is the su bjective sense of distrust. People cease to rely upon the web of interrelations that hold th e community together. Neighbors, police, the telephone co m pa ny are successivel y co-opted. Through all this travail they rely first and last upon th ei r ph ysician .
MEDICINE AS THE DEFENDER AGAINST THE BODY SNATCHERS
At the beginning of the original movie, we se e Dr. Miles Bennell hu r r yin g back from a medical convention in response to an urgent message fr om h is nurse. His patients have been demanding to see him for two weeks but won 't tell anyone else why. There is a rumor about people who believ e their r elatives are imposters. Upon arriving in town, Dr. Bennell ruminates " . . . e ve ry th in g lo ok ed the same but wasn 't ... something evil had taken possession o f the town ."
Here at the beginning of the film, so early as to almost escape notice, it is established that body-snatching is a medical problem. Without an y prompting by those in authority, the populace decides that this inexplicable transformation in their loved ones is something to bring to the attention of their fa m ily doctor.
Eventually a psychiatrist is also consulted, but the clergy are conspicuous in their absence.
The people of Santa Mira expect Dr. Bennell not onl y to know what to do for those snatched but a lso to be able to determine who has been snatched and what that consists of. Becky queries: "What's going on? Mayb e you can tell me-you're the doctor." That is, he is expected to perform tasks of both medical therapeutics and diagnosis. In the beginning this presents the difficult p roblem of determining whether it is the one transformed or the o ne witnessing the transformation that requ ires treatment. Dr. Bennell chaste ns W ilma Lenz, "No one could impersonate your Uncle Ira without yo ur seeing a mill io n little differences. . .. When you see this you will realize th e trouble is insid e you."
The nature of the trouble inside Wilma Lenz or, for that matter, inside her Uncle Ira, is not immediatel y clear. Wilma could be perceiving t h ings falsely due to some disorder insid e her mind or Ira could be act ing odd ly d ue to some disorder ins ide h is body. The problem could be ps ychiatric or medical.
Insofar as the problem is thought to originate in side th e bo dy of those afflicted it is interpreted as a medical disorder. This is co ns iste n t with co ntemporary medical practice. Problems within society are d eemed medical insofar as they appear to spring from sources intrinsic to the body.
Since approximately 1800 when autopsy-based clin ico-pathological correlation became the gold standard in medical diagnosis, th e d esir e to kn ow the nature of disease has taken the form of a desire to open the body so as to be able to loo k inside. Thereby, as Michel Foucault explains in his Th e Birth of the Clinic Miles is called to his friend Jack's house because Jack has di sco vered a body on his billiard table . Miles is expected to diagnose the situation . Adopti ng the medical attitude, he rem ar ks that" . .. (the) face is vague ... (t he) body has all its features but no detai l. It is not a corpse-what els e co u ld it be?" T he bod y is not alive, but it is not a usual dead body either. The distinctively medical im p ulse of Dr. Ben ne ll is to open the body to find out what is goin g on. H e checks his impulse , however, wit h these words. "It sounds crazy, but if! did an au topsy, I'd find every organ in perfect condition . As perfect as th e body is externally, everything in working order." Dr. Bennell already se nses, albeit vagu ely, that body-snatching is not a disease that can be known in th e usu al medical manner. Bod y-sna tching is a disease of the soul , an organ not easily r eveal ed at a utopsy.
To t he extent that Dr. Be n nell's task of defending th e populace is a task of J EFF ERSON JO URNAL O F PSYCH IAT RY medical diagnosis, he must be able to determine: who is al r eady sna tched? At the beginning of the movie this consists in determining wh ether it isJi mmy Grimaldi or his mother who is sick, whether Wilma Lenz or her Uncle Ira has changed. By the middle of the movie the ta sk simply becomes one of d etermin ing who can be trusted. One cannot trust the body-snatchers to admit t hat th ey have been snatched. One cannot r el y upon trust to determine wh en trust is appropriate. Medical diagnosis, if it is to be useful here , must be abl e to d etermine whether so meo ne has been snatched or not without relying upon th ei r veracity. The attempt to know anoth er person in a way immune to that person's capacity to conceal hi s true thoughts and feelings is di stincti vel y Cartesian . It is based upon th e idea that to know another we must know th e one inside the body. One must not trust the body, but rather peel ba ck its covering to confront directly the feelings in side. The postulated power of Descartes' De mo n means that behavior ma y tell nothing of belief. In th e presence o f this Demo n-o r the body-sn atchers-we must assume that th e ap peara nce o f t he other belies his reality. In order to know the other's ex per ience, th erefore , we must gain an acce ss to it more immediate and foolproof than hi s o wn words . T he diagnostician of body-snatching must find a way of inferring fr om o u te r behavior to inner belief that is independent of the will of th e one being kn own . As th e p hilosopher Stanley Cavell has explained, this absolute susp icio n of th e o ther translates into a temptation to penetrate the other, to look in sid e hi s ex per ience-or his body-to d etermine wh at is reall y there (9) . In its impulse to <'pen the body, m edicin e seeks to root out th e body sn atch ers and defeat t he Dem o n.
It is likely that all th ese attempts to directl y confr ont th e snatcher's soul would fail. The in sid e of snatch ed bodies would look as human as their outside does. Even Dr. Bennell realizes that to open th e body o n J ack 's billiard table would likely reveal nothing abnormal. We would be ab le 'to see insid e ,' but the Cartesian impulse to b ypas s th e other in o rder to know him wo uld be thwa rted. We would not ha ve ach ieved a way of co mpar ing what t he other shows outwardly with wh at is going on in sid e hi s experien ce . The body wou ld conceal our true nature no more or less if it co u ld be seen through , if it were completely tran sparent. It wou ld r emain impossibl e to ac t ua lly get inside another's experie nce through th is window, or to share their sentien ce. Sta n ley Cavell in The Claim ofReason comments on th e r evelatory pow er of thi s fr ustration:
But if looking insid e might not settle the question whet her the friend is a human being, why isn 't this more interesting than ever, o r, if you like , more amazing th an ever? And d oesn 't this at least suggest that we cannot know that another is se n tient? (5) This failure is interesting, as Cavell e mp has izes, becau se it teaches us that our kn o wledge o f ano t her's sentience, of anoth er's humanity, m ust have a different ba sis than ou r kn owledge o f hi s body. The experience of th e patient is not accessibl e in th e same way that h is body is. T he body can be directly observed, both in side and out. T he patient ca n always co nceal hi s experience from the observing eye. Observation can prove its assertions about th e bod y; the patient must be trusted to reveal his experience.
MEDICINE AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CARTESIAN THR EAT
In its battle against the body-snatchers, medicine is decisivel y anti-Cartesian. Dr. Bennell's attempt to identify those wh o have been snatched means he must joust with the Cartesian d emon. As valiant as he may be in this, he is doomed to fail. As improbable as th e Cartesian threat of to tal d issimulation by a no ther ma y be, once it is establish ed as a real threat, it is impossibl e to d e fea t. If we must get insid e the o t her's exper ie nce to know him , th e n we will never know him.
Neverthel ess, throu gh a sub t le modification in th e Cartesian threat, medicine manages to defeat it in real life. Medicine , in th e last ana lysis, a lso seeks to know the patient by penetrating hi s body. After a co nfusing and u nsu ccessfu l clinical course, all medi cal eyes turn to the autopsy for answers. Clin icia ns attend clinicopathological conferences to di scover where th ey went wrong, to discover what disease was really present. The body is opened a nd th e d isease is revealed.
Dise ase is not only di sco vered but identified and d efined by t his means. A patient comes to th e ph ysician with a pain or ot her di sability that he is experiencing. This di sability acquires its identit y as di sease , ho wever, according to the model of the autopsy, in manner e ntirely independe nt of th e patient's experience of it. Medicine excludes the patient as se n tie nt in its ultimate identification and definition of di sease. Medical diagno sis is th us able to overcome an y shortcomings in th e patient's perception of hi s di sease , whether these be due to ignorance or deceit. Medicine has achieved a way o f kn o win g its patients that does not re ly on their truthfulness o r their ca pacity fo r se lfinterpretation .
Medicin e succeeds at this because its goal is humble r than that of th e Cartesian. Medicine does not seek a way to ind u bita b ly kn ow the experience of th e o ther entirel y without hi s coo peratio n as th e Ca rtesian does. Med icine merely seeks to kn ow th e disease o f th e other independent o f hi s cooperation . It is in th e distinction between the experience o f th e di sea se and th e di sease itself that th e ke y to medicine's su ccess in knowing th e o ther lies. Beca use it p ur sues a mind-independent disease, medicine need not penetrat e th e ex perie nce of th e other-only his body. Inflamed m eninges and th e infl am ed a p pe nd ix can be see n and known independentl y of patients' knowledge or interpretation o f th em. Their primary rea lity is no longer exper ien tial, as mi ght be explored through dialogue with the patient, but patholo gical , so methi ng e ncountered through th e autopsy o r o ne of its su rrogates such as x-rays or biopsies.
Though medicine' s response to th e Cartesi an th reat is not itself classically Cartesian , bec au se medicine accepts th e threat as real and o perates as such, it perpetuates th e power of the Demon. Because ultimate reli an ce upon th e patient's re port of hi s disease exper ie nce has been re p laced b y t he direct encounter of physician and disease at autopsy as the best evi dence for medical diagnosis, patients' reports receive less attention. They fa ll to the wayside as incomplete, uninformed, unreliable-as ultimatel y dispensibl e . They ma y be false through no fault of the patient, or through hi s deliberate d ecept io n if the patient is malingering. By setting aside the patient's exper ie nce in the u ltimate definition and identification of disease , medicine, in e ffect, assumes that th e patient might always be guilty of d ec eit, or more co m mon ly, ignorance. Medicine thus operates as if Descartes' Demon hovered over th e encounter between patient and ph ysician, a ll hi s malign power intact. As a pe rpe trato r o f th e Cartesian threat, medicine is itsel f a body-snatch er. When a patient first co mes to the doctor, the only awareness of dis ea se presen t is hi s own . The di sorder in his body and his awareness of it are intimately linked. T ogeth e r , t he y form a disability that disrupts his life . As the ph ysician becomes ac quainted with th e patient's illness by means of history, ph ysical exa m ina t io n and labo rato ry tests, it is transformed into disease-something defined bi ologi call y-co mpl etely independent of the patient's awareness of it. T he body afflicte d wit h this dis ea se has been transported from th e patient's awareness into t hat of medical professionals, tools, and institutions. The patient's interpretation of his malady is now superceded by th e medical interpretation . T his sickness is now d e fined and identified within a medical awareness that is no longe r hi s o wn . H is bod y has been snatched.
CO NCL USIO N: SNATCHING BODIES BACK
There is no hope offered that th e cit ize ns of Santa Mira mi gh t find a way to snatc h th eir bodies back from the ali ens. But in rea l life th ere is hope that we ma y be abl e to snatch our bodies ba ck from co ntempo ra ry medicine.
The recently elaborated di stinction between di sease and illn ess should help us understand how this might occu r. Eric Cassell , a refl ect ive in tern ist , has d escribed illness as " what the patient feels wh en he goes to th e d octor," and di sease as " .. . what he has on th e way home from th e d o ct or's o ffice. Disease, th en, is something an organ has; illn ess is something a man has" (6) . Arthur Kleinman, a psychiatrist a nd anth ropo log ist , explains th at sickness is initia lly expe r ie nce d b y patients as illn ess: " . . . the life concerns a nd problems that it presents for common sense understanding as part of th e every d ay wo rl d of th e sick person." Biomedical dis ea se, on the other hand, is th e " . . . mech anica l break down or disruption in biological structures and function s" ( 10). T hus, disease is a way of characterizing bodily disorder in a way independen t of th e patient's awareness of it. Disease is defined and identified independent of t he patient's capacity for self-in ter p reta tio n; it is mind-independent. Illness is mind-dependent with respect to the patient. Illness is d efined a nd identified b y means of the patient's capacity for se lf-inter p reta t io n .
As the autopsy be came incorporated into clinical medicine in th e nine-teenth century and clinicopathological correlation became th e fina l word in knowing disease, it became possib le to define " d isease " in a man ner independent of illness. At some point in the contemporary e nco u n te r between d octo r and patie n t , a backache with fever that prevents a mother from going to her son's graduation beco mes pyel o nep h ri t is, an infection in her kidney. It is in th is transformation from having an illness to having a dis ease that o ne's sickness and one's body are snatched. There are many benefits to ha ving one's sickness sna tc hed. Transported into the te chnologically supported system of medical awa reness, sickness is more like ly to be cured. As has been well-documented , however, bei ng plugged into th is system can be intensely dehumanizing. The technologica l imperatives o f modern medicine are diverse and powerful. The y have altered th e nature o f birth and death in our society. Medicine assuages our fear of di sease by giving us somewhere to go, something to do. But its priorities are not always o ur own . So metimes it seems as if we must give up control of our lives in o rder to save them . In te nsive-care nurses are often the first to sa y that th ey would never be a patient in one of the u n its where they work.
H ig h-tech medicine is accepted as having many negati ve side-effects. What is less accepted is that an exclusive focu s on the biological and chem ica l ma y not be the most effective means of dealing with disability, ma y not be th e best way to get medicine's main job done. Isolation of biolo gical factors from others relevant to healing ca n be detrimental to th e e fficie ncy and e ffective ness o f medicine. This is especially true in the case of chronic di seases suc h as d iabetes where good care requires active patient participation. It is a lso true in those common situations where primary care physicians co nfr o n t so ma t ic eq uiva lents of depression or anxiety in their patients. The relentless " r ule out" of o rgan ic causes in these situations can be wasteful (e .g ., coronary arteriogram s for pan ic disorder) or even mi sleading (e.g., the silent gall stone seen as ca use for functional a bd o m ina l pain).
This debate is far beyond m y sco pe here . I will j us t mention in passing th at at issue here is the very identity of medicine as a scie nce. Is medicine a purely natural science which limits its concern to di sordered biology? Or is it more effectively seen as a human or social scie nce which fundam entall y ad dresses th e experience of disabi lity? A move from the former to th e latter will be necessar y if medicine's body-snatching propensities are to be cu r bed .
The fears of t he people of Santa Mira as the body-snatchers begin to take over are fears we each kno w too well. These very worldly fears include the fear of isolation , of so litude, of non-communication. They also include fears o f revealing oneself and, perhaps more poignantly, of being un abl e to reveal oneself. Notably, these are the same fears sickness imposes on us. Eac h of us fears death, and perhaps more so , the dis ease and pain that will precede it. Bu t even when this fate is accepted, the fear of d ying alone r emains almost u ni versal. T o face horrible pain tota lly alone, to pa ss from life without a whis per of concern from another, these are dire prospect s even a fter one has accep te d the inevitability of death itself. Those who care for us in sickness must respond to this threat of isolation as well as th e threat of death .
If our soj o u rn with the body-snatchers has taught us anything about Cartesianism in medicine, it is that th e relation betwee n soul and bod y within modern medicine must be understood in terms o f th e d ynami cs of proof and trust between doctor and patient. I have addressed this issue in more detail elsewhere (11) . For now, it must suffice for us to understand slig htly better how proof and trust in medicine help us face death .
Proven knowledge is secu re knowledge. It stands firml y in th e face of death. When isolating the cause of biological death we want to be sure of what we know. The stakes are too high to accept anything less. We seek to d en y d eath its power not only over our bodies, but over our knowledge as well. T he Cartesia n canons of proof were designed to produce knowledge that would esca pe d eath .
Trust is a basis for knowledge that accepts its limits in a way th at proo f does not. Always founded upon uncertainty, it accepts the finitude o f ou r kn o wing. Trust shares our fear of death : that all will not be finished , complete , or sure when we die.
Clearly, both proof and trust have a role in th e doct or-patient rel atio nsh ip and in medicine as a whole. We expect the scien tific physician to pu rsue knowledge of our sickness with a rigor commensurate with th e hi ghest standards of proof. We also expect that we will be able to share our ex perience of sickness with our physician even though nothing about it ca n be d efinitivel y p ro ved . It is this experience that first brings th e patient to his physician. Fr om t he patient's point of view it is the sine qua non o f medicine.
In a relatively sho r t time m edicine has acquired immensel y powe r ful tools for diagnosis. Now it must employ those tools in a way that do es not deny patients' se ntie nce. The people of Santa Mira would unde rstand o nly too well this ne ed to have one's ex iste nc e and exper ie nc e co nfir med by o ther humans.
